The fuel line couplings on the N-22 were located on the underside of the wing, just behind the leading edge. An inexperienced ground person had used the wrong power lift truck for the N-22 and had jammed the platform railing into the fuel hose while the hose was hooked into the wing. This bent the hose bracket into the wing coupler, bent the coupler plate, and damaged the nearby slats pin.
Slats locking pins were an infrequent change item, and Melbourne repair station did not have one in stock. Rather than delay the aircraft in Australia, it was decided to allow the plane to continue to Singapore and change the part there. However, a sharp-eyed maintenance person in Singapore noticed that the paper on their replacement locking pin appeared suspect. Maintenance crews were uncertain whether the replacement pin was genuine or not.
Since the part already in place functioned normally, Singapore elected not to replace it, and the aircraft was sent on to Hong Kong, the home terminal for Transpacific, where a genuine replacement part was assured. Hong Kong Repair Station - fully aware they were located in a world center for counterfeiting - took special precautions to insure their spare aviation parts were genuine. They ordered parts directly from the original equipment manufacturers in the United States. On November 13 of the previous year, a brand-new slats locking pin was installed on the aircraft.
Paper for the part appeared to be proper; a photocopy came up on Casey's screen. The part had come from Hoffman Metal Works in Montclair, California - Norton's original supplier. But Casey knew the paper was fake, because the part itself was fake. She would run it down later, and find out where the part had actually come from.
But right now, the only question was the one Amos had posed:
Were other parts replaced, as well?
Sitting at her terminal, Casey scrolled through the maintenance summary records for Hong Kong Repair Station for November 13, to find what else had been done to the aircraft mat day.
It was slow going; she had to look at photocopies of maintenance cards, with scrawled handwritten notations after each checkbox. But eventually she found a list of work that had been done on the wing.
There were three notations.
CHG RT LDLT FZ-7. Change the right landing light fuse 7.
CHG RT SLTS LK PIN. Change the right slats locking pin.
CK ASS EQ PKG. Check the associated equipment package. This was followed by a mechanic's notation NRML. Meaning it was checked and normal.
The associated equipment package was a maintenance sub-grouping of related parts that had to be checked whenever a faulty part was detected. For example, if seals on the right fuel lines were found to be worn, it was standard practice to check' seals on the left side as well, since they were part of the associated equipment package.
Changing the slats locking pin had triggered a maintenance check of associated equipment.
But which equipment?
She knew the associated equipment packages were specified by Norton. But she couldn't pull up the list on her office computer. To do that, she would have to go back to the terminal on the floor.
She pushed away from her desk.
BLD6 64
2:40 P.M.
Building 64 was nearly deserted, the widebody line seemingly abandoned between shifts. There was a one-hour delay between first and second shifts, because it took that long for the parking lots to clear. First shift ended at 2:30 P.M. Second shift started at 3:30.
This was the time that Jerry Jenkins had said she should examine the records because there wouldn't be an audience. She had to admit he was right. There was nobody around now.
Casey went directly to the parts cage, looking for Jenkins, but he wasn't there. She saw the QA section manager, and asked where Jerry Jenkins was.
"Jerry? He went home," the manager said.
"Why?"
"Said he wasn't feeling good."
Casey frowned. Jenkins shouldn't have left until after five. She went to the terminal to bring up the information herself.
Typing at the keyboard, she soon had called up the database of associated maintenance packages. She keyed in RT SLATS LK PIN and got the answer she was looking for.
RT SLATS ERV TRK (22 / RW / 2-5455 / SLS)
RT SLATS LVR (22 / RW / 2-5769 / SLS)
RT SLATS HVD ACT (22 / RW / 2-7334 / SLS)
RT SLATS PSTN (22 / RW / 2-3444 / SLS)
RT SLATS FD CPLNG (22 / RW / 2-3445 / SLC)
RT PRX SNSR (22 / RW / 4-0212 / PRC)
RT PRX SNSR CPLNG (22 / RW / 4-0445 / PRC)
RT PRX SNSR PLT (22 / RW / 4-0343 / PRC)
RT PRX SNSR WC (22 / RW / 4-0102 / PRW)
It made sense. The associated parts package consisted of the other five elements of the slats drive track: the track, the lever, the hydraulic actuator, the piston, the forward coupling.
In addition, the list instructed mechanics to check the nearby proximity sensor, its coupling, cover plate, and wiring.
She knew Doherty had already inspected the drive track. If Amos was right, they ought to look very carefully at that proximity sensor. She didn't think anybody had done that yet.
The proximity sensor. It was located deep in the wing. Difficult to get to. Difficult to inspect.
Could that have caused a problem?
Yes, she thought, it was possible.
She shut down the terminal and crossed the plant floor, heading back to her office. She needed to call Ron Smith, to tell him to check the sensor. She walked beneath deserted aircraft toward the open doors at the north end of the building.
As she neared the doors, she saw two men enter the hangar. They were silhouetted against the midday sunlight, but she could see that one wore a red checked shirt. And the other had on a baseball cap.
Casey turned to ask the QA floor manager to call Security. But he was gone; the wire cage stood empty. Casey looked around, and suddenly realized the floor was deserted. She saw no one except an elderly black woman at the far end of the building, pushing a broom. The woman was half a mile away.